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ABSTRACT—The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
requires schools to provide all students who qualify for special education
services with a free appropriate public education (FAPE). However, the
IDEA does not specify how much substantive educational benefit students
must be afforded in order to receive a FAPE, leaving this question for the
courts. For over thirty years, courts split over the amount of educational
benefit that school districts must provide to their special education students,
leading to significant confusion and anxiety among parents and school
officials regarding their legal rights. The Supreme Court sought to clarify
this standard in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1 by ruling
that special education students must receive an education that would allow
them to make “appropriate progress” based on their individual
circumstances. Unfortunately, the Court’s new standard created additional
ambiguity and left lingering questions among stakeholders within the
education community regarding school districts’ obligations to these
students. This Note addresses these questions by identifying the implications
of the Court’s appropriate progress standard for students, teachers, and
school operations, and proposes that courts adopt a two-part test for applying
the new standard that evaluates both the procedures of particular institutions
and the substantive value of students’ individualized curricula. Defining the
FAPE requirement this way would clarify the standard and provide stability
in an area of law plagued by inconsistency.
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INTRODUCTION
In the 2015–2016 school year, 6.7 million public school students
between the ages of three and twenty-one—representing 13% of all public
school students in the country—received special education services. 1 One of
these students was Endrew F., a fifth-grade boy who was diagnosed with
autism and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as a child.
Because of his disabilities, Endrew had problems communicating personal
needs and emotions, interacting with others in social routines and play, and
coping with his severe fears of everyday stimuli—such as flies, spills, and
public restrooms. Endrew also had compulsive and disruptive behaviors that
surfaced in class, including loud vocalizations, the continuous repetition of
words and phrases, climbing over furniture and other students, and even
fleeing the classroom at inappropriate times. All of these obstacles made it
difficult for Endrew to access education within the traditional public school
setting.

1 The Condition of Education - Indicators - Children and Youth with Disabilities, NAT’L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cgg.asp (last updated Apr. 2018)
[https://perma.cc/7MBH-U4ZR].
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Endrew’s school attempted to respond to these issues by providing him
with additional educational support and formulating goals designed
specifically for him. Despite this extra assistance, however, Endrew still
struggled to meet his individualized goals and make the appropriate amount
of academic and social progress for a student of his age. 2 While Endrew’s
circumstances unfortunately mirror those of many similarly situated
students, his case is particularly notable because it served as the backdrop
for the most recent decision in special education law—a decision that will
likely have a significant impact on students, teachers, and administrators in
the years to come.
Children with disabilities receive special education services in part
because of the procedures outlined in the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act of 1990 (IDEA). 3 The IDEA mandates that all students with
disabilities receive a free appropriate public education (FAPE), 4 which
requires school districts to provide each qualifying child with an
individualized education program (IEP) and any accompanying services that
the school deems appropriate. 5 However, despite the enactment of federal
legislation attempting to address these issues and the development of
programs intended to help facilitate student development, children like
Endrew continue to be neglected. This raises the question: How can school
districts better ensure that students with disabilities receive a proper
education?
Although the IDEA establishes strict and uniform procedures for
developing an IEP, 6 it does not address how substantively challenging the
IEP must be for students with disabilities. As a result, courts have attempted
2 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE 1, No. 12-cv-2620-LTB, 2014 WL 4548439 (D. Colo.
Sept. 15, 2014), aff’d, 798 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
3 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012). Congress passed the IDEA as a reauthorization of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101476, 104 Stat. 1103.
4 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). The IDEA defines a free appropriate public education as special education
and related services that (1) have been provided at public expense under public supervision and direction
without charge, (2) meet the standards of the state educational agency, (3) include an appropriate
preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the state involved, and (4) are provided
in conformity with the statute’s IEP requirement. Id. § 1401(9).
5 Id. § 1412(a)(4). The IDEA defines a “child with a disability” as a child “(i) with intellectual
disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual
impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . ., orthopedic impairments, autism,
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason
thereof, needs special education and related services.” Id. § 1401(3)(A). Either parents, teachers, or
education agency officials may request that a student be evaluated to determine if the child qualifies as a
“child with a disability,” and states must conduct the evaluation to determine the educational needs of the
child within sixty days of a request. Id. § 1414(a)(1).
6 See infra Section I.A.
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to fill in the gaps regarding how much substantive educational benefit
students must achieve through their IEP to satisfy the requirements of a
FAPE. 7 Prior to the Court’s ruling in Endrew F., the primary Supreme Court
case addressing this issue was Board of Education v. Rowley 8—a case that
was widely considered to be precedent regarding the educational rights of
children with disabilities for over thirty years. 9 According to Rowley, if a
student’s IEP explained an educational program that was “reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits,” then the FAPE
requirement was satisfied. 10
However, the Court’s decision in Rowley yielded two divergent
interpretations. Expounding on the “reasonably calculated” standard, the
Court indicated that Congress meant for an IEP to require schools to confer
“some educational benefit,” 11 yet the Court also stated that school districts
must confer a “meaningful” benefit to students through their individualized
curricula. 12 Circuit courts that followed the “some educational benefit”
interpretation acknowledged that an IEP does not need to guarantee the
maximization of a child’s potential but instead needs only to provide a
7

The IDEA grants the Secretary of Education the authority to issue regulations that “are necessary
to ensure that there is compliance with the specific requirements of [the IDEA].” 20 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
However, “[s]ince neither the IDEA nor its regulations [promulgated by the Department of Education]
include a precise definition of the term appropriate, it is necessary to turn to judicial interpretations for
guidance on the meaning of FAPE.” ALLAN G. OSBORNE, JR. & CHARLES J. RUSSO, SPECIAL EDUCATION
AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS 31 (3d ed. 2014). Ultimately, the Supreme Court is better
suited to address this interpretation because its decisions are more consistent, given that it will not change
as presidential administrations change—this allows students and parents to better understand their legal
rights. See Casey Bayer, DeVos Rescinds Guidance Documents for Disabled Students: What Does It
Mean?, HARV. GRADUATE SCH. EDUC. (Oct. 24, 2017, 5:02 PM), https://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/17/
10/devos-rescinds-guidance-documents-disabled-students-what-does-it-mean [https://perma.cc/DC2ZA8PT] (interviewing Professor Thomas Hehir, former director of the U.S. Department of Education’s
Office on Special Education Programs, regarding Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos’s decision to
rescind seventy-two guidance documents that provide interpretation for policies and regulations under
the IDEA). Furthermore, it is more appropriate for courts to address this issue because many of the
regulations instituted by the Department of Education have political motivations that may be inconsistent
with congressional intent. See id. (highlighting that the Department of Education’s decision to rescind the
guidance documents may be part of the Trump Administration’s effort to show that it is “in the business
of deregulating”).
8 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
9 See Julie F. Mead & Mark A. Paige, Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson v. Rowley: An
Examination of Its Precedential Impact, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 329, 329 (2008) (stating that “Rowley stands
firm as the primary precedent whenever the educational rights of children with disabilities are
considered”); Terry Jean Seligmann, Sliding Doors: The Rowley Decision, Interpretation of Special
Education Law, and What Might Have Been, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 71, 71 (2012) (“As the first decision by the
Supreme Court interpreting the IDEA, the case was expected to be a landmark opinion. And in fact, the
decision in Rowley has remained the standard for interpretation of many aspects of the IDEA.”).
10 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207.
11 Id. at 200.
12 Id. at 192.
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benefit that is merely more than de minimis. 13 In contrast, the circuits that
followed the “meaningful educational benefit” interpretation argued that
Congress designed the IDEA to confer more than a trivial benefit to students
with disabilities. 14 The resulting circuit split following Rowley had
significant consequences for students, parents, and school board officials,
leaving questions among these individuals regarding their legal rights.
The Supreme Court finally addressed this split in Endrew F. v. Douglas
County School District RE-1 15 by establishing a standard for determining
how substantively challenging an IEP must be to adequately provide a
student with a FAPE. In doing so, the Court first noted that judges must
evaluate IEPs using a standard that is “markedly more demanding than the
‘merely more than de minimis’ test.” 16 The Court further stated that, in order
for a child to receive a FAPE, the IEP must be “appropriately ambitious” and
“reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light
of the child’s circumstances.” 17 However, despite raising the minimum
benefit requirement above the de minimis threshold, the Court declined to
establish a bright-line rule for what appropriate progress would look like in
each individual case; instead, the Court merely stressed that lower courts
should defer to the judgment of school authorities. 18
Following Endrew F., therefore, there continues to be a wide range of
interpretations of this new standard among the lower courts, yielding vastly
different outcomes and creating additional confusion. 19 The appropriate
progress standard established in Endrew F. has left two lingering issues: first,
what is the practical impact of this standard on students with disabilities and
the schools they attend; and second, how should district courts interpret
appropriate progress going forward? One potential benefit of this standard is
13 See, e.g., Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1154 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A] school
district is not required to provide every service that would benefit a student if it has found a formula that
can reasonably be expected to generate some progress on that student’s IEP goals.”).
14 See, e.g., Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988)
(holding that an IEP was invalid because it afforded no more than trivial progress, contradicting
Congress’s intent “to afford children with special needs an education that would confer meaningful
benefit”).
15 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
16 Id. at 1000 (quoting Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir.
2015)).
17 Id. at 1000–01.
18 Id. at 1001. The Endrew F. decision garnered even more mainstream attention because it reversed
a standard originally stated by then-Circuit judge Neil Gorsuch and became a point of contention during
his Supreme Court confirmation hearing. See Holly T. Howell, Note, Neil Gorsuch, a Unanimous
SCOTUS, and a Circuit Split Resolved: What Is the Big “IDEA”?, 40 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 603, 609–13
(2017) (describing how Senator Dick Durbin and other Democratic Senators questioned Justice Gorsuch
about his opinion in Luke P., which was ultimately overturned by the Endrew F. decision).
19 See infra Section II.B.
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that it could supply students who receive special education services with vital
resources that will assist them in further developing their academic, social,
and behavioral skills. 20 As a consequence of this new standard, however,
school programs may undergo significant changes, and school administrators
will likely be forced to make difficult decisions regarding the allocation of
their limited resources. 21
This Note provides the first comprehensive analysis of these issues and
their impact on schools and courtrooms and argues that, in spite of its
ambiguity, Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard requires much-needed
academic and social benefits to students with special needs. However, while
Endrew F.’s standard has the potential to greatly protect the interests of
students with disabilities, the standard could still be clarified so that students,
parents, and administrators better understand their legal rights. This Note
thus offers a solution to help resolve this ambiguity by proposing that the
standard outlined in Endrew F. be understood as a two-part test: first, in
determining whether an IEP would confer a meaningful benefit, courts
should evaluate whether the school district’s procedures for developing IEPs
are adequate; and second, courts should determine whether a student’s IEP
substantively addresses the specific needs of the student. This Note further
elaborates on this test by providing objective guidelines for courts to use in
order to determine whether each part has been satisfied.
In doing so, this Note proceeds as follows. Part I explains the
development of IDEA and FAPE jurisprudence, including the Court’s
holding in Rowley and the circuit split that followed. It then describes the
changes in education law between Rowley and Endrew F. and assesses how
legislation enacted during this period may have impacted the holding in
Endrew F. Next, Part II explores the Endrew F. case in depth and analyzes
the Court’s reexamination of the FAPE requirement and how district courts
have interpreted the new appropriate progress standard. Part III examines the
implications of the appropriate progress standard for school districts and
argues that requiring the use of a more demanding standard to evaluate IEPs
will lead to greater inclusion of students with disabilities in general education
classrooms, force school districts to allocate more resources to special
education, and cause decreased enrollment of students with disabilities in
charter schools. Finally, Part IV explains how courts should assess whether
an IEP would foster appropriate progress by proposing a two-part test that
helps clarify this ambiguous standard.

20
21
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THE IDEA, ROWLEY, AND U.S. EDUCATION LAW PRE-ENDREW F.

For much of American history, the educational needs of children with
disabilities were not being fully met—schools were not providing these
students with appropriate educational services that addressed their specific
needs, certain children were excluded entirely from the public school system,
and public schools did not possess adequate resources, which ultimately
forced families to find educational services outside the public school
system. 22 In response to these issues, Congress enacted the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) in 1975 23 and later reauthorized
EAHCA in 1990, changing the language of the law to emphasize the
individual student (instead of the condition) and renaming the law the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 24
While the IDEA provides uniform procedural rights for students with
disabilities, interpretations of the substantive FAPE standard were highly
inconsistent and were further complicated by shifts in the legal landscape of
education law between the Court’s decisions in Rowley and Endrew F. This
Part provides a brief background of the IDEA’s procedural requirements, the
establishment of Rowley’s substantive FAPE standard, and the disparate
interpretations of this standard that subsequently ensued. This Part then
examines how the enactment of laws that provided increased protections for
students with disabilities may have ultimately influenced the Court’s
decision in Endrew F.
A. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
In 1990, Congress passed the IDEA as a reauthorization of EAHCA 25
in response to public perception that a majority of children with disabilities
“were either totally excluded from schools or sitting idly in regular
classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to ‘drop out.’” 26
Congress acknowledged the necessity of this law because “[i]mproving
educational results for children with disabilities is an essential element of
[the United States’] national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity . . .
for individuals with disabilities.” 27 In order to resolve these issues, Congress
22

20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2012).
Id.
24 Mitchell L. Yell et al., The Legal History of Special Education: What a Long, Strange Trip It’s
Been!, 19 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 219, 226 (1998).
25 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773.
26 H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 2 (1975) (citing Investigation of the Adequacy of Federal and Other
Resources for Education and Training of the Handicapped: Hearings Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on
the Handicapped of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 89th Cong. (1966)).
27 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1). The purposes of the IDEA include ensuring that children with disabilities
possess special education and related services designed both to meet their unique needs and to prepare
23
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enacted the IDEA, which aimed to provide federal monetary assistance to
state and local school systems so they would have the resources necessary to
address the educational needs of students with disabilities. 28
A state can qualify for this federal monetary assistance by submitting a
plan to the Secretary of Education outlining the policies and procedures it
will enact to ensure each of its students receives a FAPE. 29 In order to achieve
this, the IDEA specifically requires a state to guarantee that each child with
a disability receives a uniquely tailored individualized education program
(IEP). 30 To develop an IEP, educators, parents, and specialists evaluate a
student’s particular strengths and weaknesses and decide which special
services will be required for the student to achieve individualized goals. The
IEP is then prepared at a meeting with the student’s parents, the regular
education teacher, at least one special education teacher, and a qualified
member of the local educational agency. 31 IEP goals can address several
different areas of student development, ranging from achieving specific
academic benchmarks to satisfying broader behavioral goals. 32 Among other
things, the IEP must include statements about the student’s present levels of
academic achievement and functional performance, measurable annual
academic and functional goals, a description of how the child’s progress will
be measured, specific special education services that will be provided, and
an explanation of the extent to which the child will be educated outside the
regular classroom. 33 The IDEA also requires that the IEP be periodically
“developed, reviewed, and revised for each child.” 34
them for further education, employment, and independent living; assisting local and federal agencies in
implementing special education plans; helping implement early intervention services for infants and
toddlers with disabilities and their families; and ensuring that educators and parents have the necessary
tools to improve educational results for children with disabilities. Id. § 1400(d)(1)–(3).
28 Id. § 1411(a). In 2013–2014, the federal government provided IDEA grants at a rate of $1743 per
student with a disability, which equaled 14.5% of the average expenditure per general education student.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 31
(2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget16/summary/16summary.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9TMA-PMOG].
29 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).
30 Id. § 1412(a)(4).
31 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
32 See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF SPECIAL EDUC. TEACHERS, COMPLETED SAMPLE IEP 2–8 (2017),
http://depts.washington.edu/lend/building_skills_files/5%20IEP%20C%20%20Sample_Distance%20Le
arners%20for%20webposting_2-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/95WF-9YVB].
33 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
34 Id. § 1412(a)(4). If parents or guardians of students with disabilities are unsatisfied with their
child’s education, the IDEA allows them to present a complaint “with respect to any matter relating to
the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate
public education to such child.” Id. § 1415(b)(6)(A). These complaints must be resolved through an
impartial due process hearing, id. § 1415(f)(1)(A), and any aggrieved party may appeal the findings of
the hearing to the state educational agency to be reviewed by an administrative official, id. § 1415(g)(1).
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In addition to the FAPE requirement, the IDEA also requires that
students with disabilities are educated in the least restrictive environment
(LRE). 35 The LRE concept originated from procedural and substantive due
process doctrines and equal protection principles. 36 The IDEA’s LRE
mandate stresses that students with disabilities should be taught as much as
possible in general education classrooms and should only be removed from
the regular educational environment and placed into a self-contained special
education classroom 37 if their disability hinders their ability to achieve a
satisfactory education. 38
While the IDEA outlines rigorous procedural obligations for school
districts, it does not contain any substantive standard regarding the level of
educational benefit that an IEP must provide to students with disabilities in
order for them to adequately receive FAPEs. This omission has thus left the
courts in the position of devising an appropriate standard.

Any party aggrieved by the findings of the state administrative hearing possesses “the right to bring a
civil action with respect to the complaint . . . in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district
court of the United States . . . .” Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
35 Id. § 1412(a)(5).
36 See, e.g., Theresa M. DeMonte, Comment, Finding the Least Restrictive Environment for
Preschoolers Under the IDEA: An Analysis and Proposed Framework, 85 WASH. L. REV. 157, 171
(2010); Sarah E. Farley, Comment, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing Classroom Placement of
Students with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 77 WASH. L. REV. 809, 840 (2002) (“The placement of
children with disabilities in the least restrictive environment is founded on equal protection
principles . . . .”); Daniel H. Melvin II, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities,
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 648 (1995) (“[T]he legislative history of the [IDEA] shows that Congress
viewed the categorical segregation of children with disabilities as a matter of constitutional dimension.
Due process protections were enacted in part to assure that every child with a disability is ‘in fact’ afforded
an education in the ‘least restrictive environment.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 15 (1975)).
37 A self-contained classroom typically consists of five to ten special education students and is led
by a special education teacher or paraeducator, who “focuses on the idea of smaller groups, a more closeknit environment, and one-on-one attention, which can help children with special needs feel safe while
fostering creativity and learning.” Suzie Dalien, Self-Contained Classroom Defined, SPECIAL EDUC. RES.
(Nov. 11, 2014, 9:08 PM), https://specialedresource.com/resource-center/self-contained-classroomdefined [https://perma.cc/QC5K-CSFL].
38 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (stating that students with disabilities should be “educated with children
who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities
from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a
child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily”). In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA in part in response to circuit court cases
interpreting the LRE provision. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37; Farley, supra note 36, at 816. The 1997 Amendments strengthened the
LRE provision by stressing the importance of including students with disabilities in general education
classrooms. Farley, supra note 36, at 816. Upon signing the Amendments, President Clinton lauded this
approach, emphasizing that the bill helped “put[] an even sharper focus on improving educational results
for these children through greater access to the general curriculum.” Statement on Signing the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, 1 PUB. PAPERS 701, 701 (June 4, 1997).
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B. Rowley and the Court’s Initial Articulation of the FAPE Standard
The Supreme Court first examined the FAPE standard in Board of
Education v. Rowley. 39 In Rowley, the parents of a deaf student argued that
their child’s IEP was insufficient because it did not require the presence of a
qualified sign language interpreter in each of the student’s academic
classes. 40 Instead, the IEP included a provision requiring the teacher to speak
into a wireless transmitter in order to amplify her words. 41 Though Rowley
advanced easily from grade to grade under this program, 42 the district court
held that Rowley’s IEP was inadequate because it did not provide her with
“an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the
opportunity provided to other children.” 43
While the Second Circuit affirmed this ruling, the Supreme Court
reversed, lambasting the district court’s “equal opportunity” standard
because it would require judges to make impossible measurements and
comparisons. 44 The Court stated that there was “no additional requirement
that the services so provided be sufficient to maximize each child’s potential
‘commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.’” 45 Using this
rationale, it found that Rowley’s excellent progress and the specialized
instruction offered in her IEP satisfied the IDEA’s FAPE requirement. 46
Ultimately, the Court declined to establish a bright-line test for determining
the adequacy of educational benefits afforded to children with disabilities 47
and, instead, merely stated that the FAPE requirement is satisfied if the IEP
explains an educational program that is “reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits.” 48
Expounding on this “reasonably calculated” standard, the Court in its
opinion noted that Congress meant for an IEP to require “some educational
benefit,” 49 while simultaneously stating that school districts must confer a

39 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Although the Court interpreted the FAPE standard under the EAHCA, the
IDEA possesses the same FAPE requirement that was addressed in Rowley. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(1)(A) (requiring that states provide each child who has a disability a free appropriate public
education).
40 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 185.
43 Id. at 185–86.
44 Id. at 198.
45 Id. (quoting Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
46 Id. at 202–03.
47 Id. at 202.
48 Id. at 207.
49 Id. at 200.
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“meaningful” benefit. 50 This seemingly contradictory language led lower
courts to subsequently adopt vastly different interpretations regarding the
amount of benefit that must be conferred to students with disabilities through
their IEPs. As a result, for more than thirty years, courts reached different
decisions for cases with seemingly identical facts, leaving parents and school
board officials confused about their legal rights under the IDEA.
C. “Some Educational Benefit” vs. “Meaningful Educational Benefit”
The Court’s decision in Rowley led to a debate among school attorneys
and advocates over whether the FAPE standard required that students with
disabilities receive either a “meaningful educational benefit” or “some
educational benefit.” 51 The fact that certain circuits utilized both standards
further added to the confusion, 52 and the ambiguity and inconsistency
surrounding the use of the “meaningful educational benefit” and “some
educational benefit” standards even led one district judge to question
whether there was truly a difference between them at all.53 This Section
attempts to answer that question by examining the distinctions between these
two standards. First, this Section outlines the origins of these standards in
Rowley, and then it concludes by discussing circuit court case law addressing
each standard with a focus on how these varying interpretations yielded
disparate results.
1. The “Some Educational Benefit” Standard
The “some educational benefit” standard originally derived from the
Court’s decision in Rowley. 54 Prior to the Court’s decision in Endrew F., the
majority of circuit courts exclusively used a variation of the “some
educational benefit” test to evaluate whether an IEP satisfied the FAPE
50

Id. at 192.
See Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A Circuit by Circuit Review of How Rowley Has
Been Interpreted, 247 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1–2 (2009) (comparing various circuit courts’
interpretations of Rowley in different contexts).
52 Compare, e.g., Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
that the evidence did not support a finding that a child’s IEP was inadequate to provide the student with
an appropriate education because an IEP must only be designed to confer some educational benefit), with
Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a student was entitled
to public funding of his or her attendance at a private school under the IDEA because the IEP must be
reasonably calculated to provide some meaningful benefit).
53 See Blake C. v. Dep’t of Educ., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1206 (D. Haw. 2009) (“Various opinions
have left it ambiguous as to what the precise difference, if any, is between ‘meaningful’ benefit and
‘some’ benefit.” (quoting Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 1313 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008))).
54 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200 (“Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a ‘free
appropriate public education’ is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be
sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child.” (emphasis added) (quoting
20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1982))).
51
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requirement. 55 The decisions from these circuits demonstrate that the
application of this standard afforded only limited protection for students with
disabilities. For instance, the Tenth Circuit applied the “some educational
benefit” standard in Thompson R2-J School District v. Luke P. 56 and stated
that an IEP must provide a benefit that “must merely be ‘more than de
minimis.’” 57 In another case, the Tenth Circuit also noted that, while an IEP
must be reasonably calculated to provide educational benefits to a child with
disabilities, the student’s education does not need to be “guaranteed to
maximize the child’s potential.” 58
The Sixth Circuit applied an infamous interpretation of the “some
educational benefit” standard in Doe v. Board of Education of Tullahoma
City Schools. 59 In Doe, a student had qualified for special education services
because of a neurological impairment that hindered his ability to process
auditory information and engage in normal language and thinking skills. 60
Doe’s parents alleged that the IEP provided by their student’s public school
was inadequate and that their child could only receive a FAPE by enrolling
in a private school specifically for children with learning disabilities. 61 The
parents sued the school district in order to compel funding for their child’s
private school education. 62 The Sixth Circuit held that under the “some
educational benefit” standard, an IEP must only “provide the educational
55 See, e.g., Sytsema, 538 F.3d at 1317 (finding that the IEP “provided adequate generalization
services for [the child] to receive some educational benefit”); Lt. TB. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d
80, 83 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[U]nder the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Educ. v. Rowley, . . . IDEA
does not require a public school to provide what is best for a special needs child . . . .”); A.B. v. Lawson,
354 F.3d 315, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (“IDEA’s FAPE standards are far more modest than to require that a
child excel or thrive. The requirement is satisfied when the state provides the disabled child with
‘personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from
the instruction.’” (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203)); Devine v. Indian River Cty. Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d
1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A] student is only entitled to some educational benefit; the benefit need
not be maximized to be adequate.”); Gill v. Columbia 93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d 1027, 1035 (8th Cir. 2000)
(“The standard to judge whether an IEP is appropriate under IDEA is whether it offers instruction and
supportive services reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit to the student for whom it
is designed.”); Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Pub. Sch., 931 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“There seems
to be little doubt that [the child] would have made less progress under the District of Columbia program,
but Rowley precludes our taking that factor into account so long as the public-school alternative confers
some educational benefit.”).
56 540 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008).
57 Id. at 1149 (quoting Urban v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 727 (10th Cir. 1996)).
58 Sytsema, 538 F.3d at 1313.
59 9 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 1993).
60 Id. at 456.
61 Id. at 456–57.
62 Id. at 457. Under the IDEA, if parents of a child with a disability choose to take their child out of
public school and enroll him or her in a private school, a court may require the public school to reimburse
the parents for the costs of the private school enrollment if the court finds that the public school had not
made a FAPE available to that student. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (2012).
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equivalent of a serviceable Chevrolet . . . [and] that the Board [of Education]
is not required to provide a Cadillac.” 63 Ultimately, the courts’ decisions in
these cases illustrate that the implementation of the “some educational
benefit” standard has provided only limited protection to students with
disabilities.
2. The “Meaningful Educational Benefit” Standard
In contrast to the “some educational benefit” standard, prior to the
Court’s Endrew F. decision, the Third Circuit was the only one that
exclusively applied the “meaningful educational benefit” standard, 64
although the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits all previously utilized
the standard in at least some cases. 65 Courts that applied the more demanding
“meaningful educational benefit” standard all provided greater protection for
students with disabilities. 66
The Third Circuit explained the difference between the “some
educational benefit” and “meaningful educational benefit” standards in Polk
63

Doe, 9 F.3d at 459–60.
See, e.g., Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he
school must establish that it complied with the procedures set out in the IDEA and that the IEP was
‘reasonably calculated’ to enable the child to receive ‘meaningful educational benefits’ in light of the
child’s ‘intellectual potential.’” (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982))); T.R. v.
Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court’s holding
because the court relied on evidence that satisfied “the somewhat more stringent ‘meaningful benefit’
test”); Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding an IEP
invalid because it afforded no more than trivial progress, while “Congress intended to afford children
with special needs an education that would confer meaningful benefit”).
65 See, e.g., N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist. 541 F.3d 1202, 1212–13 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating
that “[u]nder the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, a school district must provide a student with a
‘meaningful benefit’ in order to satisfy the substantive requirements of the IDEA” (quoting Adams v.
Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999))); Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864
(6th Cir. 2004) (“At the very least, the intent of Congress appears to have been to require a program
providing a meaningful educational benefit towards the goal of self-sufficiency . . . . Indeed, states
providing no more than some educational benefit could not possibly hope to attain the lofty goals
proclaimed by Congress.”); Adams, 195 F.3d at 1150 (holding that the IDEA requires that an IEP “be
reasonably calculated to confer a meaningful benefit on the child”); Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch.
Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the IDEA mandated that “the door of public education
must be opened for a disabled child in a ‘meaningful’ way,” and IEPs that only afford the opportunity for
trivial advancement do not meet the IDEA’s requirements (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192)); CypressFairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the IDEA’s
reference to educational benefit means that the benefit must be meaningful and “likely to produce
progress, not regression or trivial educational advancement”).
66 The courts that utilized the heightened “meaningful educational benefit” standard argued that it
was appropriate based on the following language from Rowley:
By passing the [Education for All Handicapped Children Act], Congress sought primarily to make
public education available to handicapped children. But in seeking to provide such access to public
education, Congress did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational standard
than would be necessary to make such access meaningful.
458 U.S. at 192 (emphasis added).
64
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v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16. 67 There, a student with
encephalopathy, a brain disease similar to cerebral palsy, alleged that the
school district did not provide him with an adequate IEP because it did not
include weekly hands-on physical therapy from licensed physical therapists,
hindering his progress and ability to meet his educational goals. 68 The Third
Circuit held that there was “evidence in the record that would support a
finding that the program prescribed for [Polk] afforded no more than trivial
progress.” 69 The court justified its use of the “meaningful educational
benefit” standard by explaining that it would contravene Congress’s intent
in passing the IDEA to allow states to receive federal funding for making the
“idle gesture” of providing only trivial benefits. 70
Ultimately, Rowley caused deep disagreement among the circuit courts
over which of the two standards was most appropriate. This disagreement,
and the resulting inconsistent rulings, eventually prompted the Supreme
Court to address the issue in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District
RE-1. 71 In addition to resolving the two divergent standards, however, the
Court also needed to consider whether the drastic changes in the landscape
of education law post-Rowley would impact its interpretation of the
substantive FAPE standard. The next Section addresses these changes.
D. Changes in Education Law Between Rowley and Endrew F.
After Rowley, Congress passed three education-based laws intended to
provide better educational opportunities to students with disabilities: the
1997 Amendments to the IDEA, the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA
following the No Child Left Behind Act, and the Every Student Succeeds
Act of 2015. First, the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA strengthened the
IDEA’s requirement that children with disabilities must be educated in
general education classrooms to the maximum extent appropriate. 72 The
Amendments further established presumptions that students with disabilities
participate in the general curriculum, required general education teachers to
67

853 F.2d at 180–85.
Id. at 172.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 184.
71 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
72 Paolo Annino, The 1997 Amendments to the IDEA: Improving the Quality of Special Education
for Children with Disabilities, 23 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 125, 125 (1999). This
requirement is now codified in 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012) (“To the maximum extent appropriate,
children with disabilities . . . are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs
only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” (emphasis added)).
68
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participate in the creation of IEPs, and prohibited any funding mechanism
that favors placement in a nongeneral curriculum or segregated setting. 73
Second, Congress reauthorized the IDEA in 2004 in order to make it
consistent with the No Child Left Behind Act. 74 Among other things, the
reauthorization created a Highly Qualified Teacher requirement 75 for special
education teachers, required schools to administer state assessments for all
students (including children with disabilities), and mandated that states
identify and address preparation and professional development needs for
individuals who provide direct services to children with disabilities. 76
Finally, the Obama Administration’s Every Student Succeeds Act of 201577
further addressed the needs of students with disabilities by requiring school
districts to align all IEPs with state academic content standards, include
students with disabilities in their administration of statewide assessments,
and offer alternate assessments for students with more severe disabilities. 78
Taken together, Congress’s legislative actions after Rowley appeared to
heighten the substantive and procedural protections for students with
disabilities as well as the expectations for their teachers. As school districts
began to implement these newly enacted initiatives, courts struggled with
whether these changes to the legislative landscape should impact their
interpretations of Rowley. 79 These questions loomed large as the Supreme
Court considered the case of Endrew F.
73 Annino, supra note 72, at 125–26 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(5)(B), 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii)(i),
(B)(ii)).
74 See U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., IDEA – REAUTHORIZED STATUTE: ALIGNMENT WITH THE NO CHILD
LEFT BEHIND ACT, https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/tb-nclb-align.doc [https://perma.cc/
72HC-TW33] (outlining that the IDEA altered its provisions regarding definitions, allocations of funds,
performance goals, reporting, eligibility, and development plans to be consistent with the Bush
Administration’s No Child Left Behind Act).
75 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat.
2647, 2686 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(14)(C)). The Highly Qualified Teacher requirement
mandated that teachers possess bachelor’s degrees, full state certification or licensure, and knowledge of
the subject they taught, which is demonstrated based on a combination of teaching experience,
professional development, and knowledge in a subject garnered from the teacher’s higher education or
over time through their experience in the profession. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FACT SHEET: NEW NO CHILD
LEFT BEHIND FLEXIBILITY: HIGHLY QUALIFIED TEACHERS (2004), https://www2.ed.gov/nclb/methods/
teachers/hqtflexibility.html [https://perma.cc/F2QW-9CB5].
76 118 Stat. at 2685–87 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(14), (16)(C)).
77 Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015).
78 PSEA EDUC. SERVS. DIV., THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: SPECIAL EDUCATION
REQUIREMENTS 1 (2018), https://www.psea.org/globalassets/for-members/psea-advisories/advisoryessa-specialeducation.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7JJ-CDDT].
79 Compare N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1212–13 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding
that “[u]nder the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, a school must provide a student with a ‘meaningful
benefit’ in order to satisfy the substantive requirements of the IDEA” (quoting Adams v. Oregon, 195
F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999))), with LT. T.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2004)
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II. REEXAMINING THE FAPE STANDARD IN ENDREW F. V. DOUGLAS
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Endrew F. to resolve the circuit
split that had developed post-Rowley over the FAPE requirement. While the
Court’s decision in Endrew F. ultimately provided a new standard for
evaluating whether a student’s IEP provided a FAPE, it also raised new
questions regarding how lower courts should interpret that new standard.
This Part highlights these issues by analyzing Endrew F.’s holding and
discussing its varying interpretations by district courts.
A. Endrew F. and the Court’s New Articulation of the FAPE Standard
Endrew, a student who was diagnosed with autism at age two, attended
school in the Douglas County School District from preschool through fourth
grade. 80 During his fourth-grade year, Endrew’s parents complained that his
IEP largely carried over the same basic goals and objectives from year to
year instead of creating new, individualized yearly goals based on relevant
data and that, as a result, Endrew continually failed to make meaningful
academic and functional progress. 81 Because of this, Endrew’s parents
eventually removed him from public school and enrolled him in a private
school that specialized in educating children with autism. 82
Endrew’s private school instituted a unique behavior intervention plan 83
that resulted in dramatic improvements to his behavioral and academic
progress. 84 Six months later, Endrew’s parents again met with Douglas
County School District representatives to discuss his IEP in light of his recent
progress, and the school district developed a new IEP for Endrew. 85
However, Endrew’s parents claimed this new IEP yet again did not
meaningfully differ from the one developed the previous year, nor did it
incorporate the successful interventions utilized by his private school.86
(rejecting parents’ argument that the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA changed the Rowley standard to
require school districts to provide each student with special needs the maximum benefit).
80 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 996 (2017).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 A behavior intervention plan “is a concrete plan of action for reducing problem behaviors, dictated
by the particular needs of the student exhibiting the behaviors.” Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for Functional
Behavior Assessments and Behavior Intervention Plans: An Empirical Analysis, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
175, 175 (2011) (citing H. Rutherford Turnbull III et al., Public Policy Foundations for Positive
Behavioral Interventions, Strategies, and Supports, 2 J. POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS 218 (2000)).
While behavior intervention plans are not required components of an IEP, they are frequently included
by IEP teams as part of the student’s individualized program. See id. at 188–89.
84 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 996–97.
85 Id. at 997.
86 Id.
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Endrew’s parents rejected the school district’s proposed IEP, arguing that it
denied their son a FAPE because it “was not ‘reasonably calculated to enable
[Endrew] to receive educational benefits.’” 87 As a result, Endrew’s parents
filed a complaint with the Colorado Department of Education seeking
reimbursement for his private school tuition. 88
After an administrative law hearing and adjudications in federal court,
Endrew’s case reached the Supreme Court in 2016. 89 During oral argument,
both parties advanced vastly different interpretations of how the Court
should decide whether an IEP satisfies the FAPE requirement. According to
Endrew’s attorney, the interpretation of the standard should derive from the
IDEA’s text stating that a school’s services should be “reasonably calculated
to provide [students with disabilities] substantially equal educational
opportunities [to those offered to other students].” 90 But the Justices were
skeptical about how this ambitious standard would be applied in practice. 91
In particular, Justice Kennedy appeared concerned about the cost of this
proposed standard, 92 and Justice Breyer expressed his worry that judges
lacking expertise in education would interpret this standard inconsistently. 93
While most of the Justices did not appear persuaded by Endrew’s
proposed ambitious standard, they unanimously agreed that the “some
educational benefit,” “merely more than de minimis” test introduced by the
school district was problematic. Chief Justice Roberts stated that the Court’s
precedent in Rowley specifically required that an IEP provide “enough
benefit to keep track with grade progress,” and “that’s . . . slightly more than
de minimis.” 94 Justice Breyer also acknowledged that the 1997 Amendments
to the IDEA and the 2004 reauthorization stressed that students with
disabilities must make progress in general education, which also results in a
more stringent standard than de minimis. 95
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts reevaluated the Court’s
holding in Rowley and ultimately dismissed the school district’s argument,
87

Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)).
Id.
89 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1333 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. granted,
137 S. Ct. 29 (2016).
90 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. 988 (No. 15–827),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15-827_gfbh.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VN2G-8XD4].
91 See id. at 4–9, 13–18.
92 See id. at 8–9.
93 See id. at 13–14. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan also noted that the IDEA stresses
flexibility and that a proper standard must address those students who may not be able to follow the
general education curriculum. See id. at 6–7, 18.
94 Id. at 35–36.
95 Id. at 38.
88
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noting that “th[e] standard is markedly more demanding than the ‘merely
more than de minimis’ test.” 96 However, the opinion also rejected Endrew’s
parents’ argument that the FAPE requirement is only satisfied if it provides
a child with a disability opportunities equal to those afforded to children
without disabilities. 97 Finding a middle ground, the Court held that the IDEA
“requires an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to
make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” 98
In reaching its decision, the Court further stated that a child’s
“educational program must be appropriately ambitious in light of his
circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately
ambitious for most children in the regular classroom. The goals may differ,
but every child should have the chance to meet challenging objectives.”99
However, like in Rowley, the Court declined to establish a bright-line rule
that elaborated on what appropriate progress would actually entail, stressing
that courts should instead defer to the judgment of school authorities on that
particular question. 100
B. Endrew F.’s Initial Interpretation in the Lower Courts
While the Endrew F. decision heightened the requirements for what
constituted a FAPE, courts have struggled to articulate a clear expectation of
what this new standard means in practice. 101 Given how recently the Court
decided Endrew F., there has been limited case law interpreting the decision.
However, various courts have already begun applying different criteria in
their interpretations of the FAPE standard, creating further inconsistencies
and confusion across jurisdictions. 102 This Section examines how courts have
96 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 993, 1000–01 (quoting Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1,
798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015)).
97 Id. at 1001.
98 Id. (emphasis added).
99 Id. at 1000 (emphasis added). During oral argument, the Justices, particularly Justice Breyer,
lauded this standard because it came directly from the Department of Education and was regarded as the
most consistent with existing law. See Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Grapple with Proper
Standard for Measuring Educational Benefits for Children with Disabilities, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 11,
2017, 6:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/argument-analysis-justices-grapple-properstandard-measuring-educational-benefits-children-disabilities [https://perma.cc/ZG9L-PVQ5].
100 See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001–02.
101 This is problematic considering that scholars have previously stated that “Rowley stands firm as
the primary precedent whenever the educational rights of children with disabilities are considered,” Mead
& Paige, supra note 9, at 329, and the Court’s decision in Endrew F., which reassessed and reformulated
the Rowley standard, will likely have a similarly significant impact on these students and their legal rights.
102 See Perry A. Zirkel, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas Country School
District RE-1: A Meaningful Raising of the Bar?, 341 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 545, 551 (2017) (“The
immediate effect [of Endrew F.] on the lower courts’ FAPE cases illustrates the uncertainty [of its impact]
at least for the near future.”).
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dealt with this new standard thus far by reviewing three district court cases
from different jurisdictions, decided post-Endrew F., and evaluating how
these varying approaches have prompted new questions that courts will have
to address going forward.
1. District Court Decisions Post-Endrew F.
While current case law interpreting Endrew F. is limited, the following
three district court opinions reveal important trends, as well as some
inconsistencies, in courts’ interpretations of the new standard. First, in Paris
School District v. A.H., 103 the court considered the IEP of a child with autism
and found it did not satisfy the FAPE requirement. 104 In reaching its decision,
the court found that the school district failed to respond quickly to
developing a behavior management plan 105 and that it ignored the nuances of
behaviors that manifest with autism. 106 The court concluded that Endrew F.
imposed heightened requirements for IEPs and that the district’s plans were
inadequate “especially in light of the higher standard of Endrew F. that must
now be applied.” 107
Conversely, the court in Board of Education v. Maez 108 held that the IEP
developed for a student with autism appropriately satisfied the FAPE
requirement under the Endrew F. standard. 109 The court found that the
student’s IEP incorporated numerous teaching techniques, “which in total
were appropriately ambitious and likely to provide . . . some educational
benefit in light of his unique circumstances.” 110 The court used the term
“some” again later in the opinion when it highlighted the student’s unique
circumstances, stating that the IEP was proper because the student was
making “some meaningful progress, even if it was not the exact type of
progress that [the p]arents would have wanted.” 111
Finally, in Parker C. v. West Chester Area School District, 112 the court
found that a child with disabilities adequately received a FAPE due to his
immense progress and reasonably calculated IEP in light of his
103

No. 2:15-CV-02197, 2017 WL 1234151 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 2017).
Id. at *8.
105 Id. at *7. Behavior management plans are detailed plans created through the IEP process and
included as a part of the student’s IEP that are designed to “essentially teach a child proper behavior
through specified methods.” Robert A. Garda, Jr., Who Is Eligible Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act?, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 323 (2006).
106 A.H., 2017 WL 1234151, at *8.
107 Id. (emphasis added).
108 No. 16-cv-1082, 2017 WL 3278945 (D.N.M. Aug. 1, 2017).
109 Id. at *14.
110 Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
111 Id. at *13 (emphasis added).
112 No. 16-4836, 2017 WL 2888573 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2017).
104
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circumstances. 113 During the due process proceedings, 114 a question arose as
to whether the hearing officer applied the proper standard when evaluating
the circumstances.115 The court stated that resolution of this dispute was
“irrelevant” because the “meaningful educational benefit” standard already
employed by the Third Circuit applied in its review in light of the Endrew F.
holding. 116 While these three decisions acknowledge that Endrew F.
heightened the standard by requiring that the educational benefit be “more
demanding than the ‘merely more than de minimis’ test,” 117 there are still
important differences in how courts evaluated the appropriate progress
standard.
2. Emergence of New Questions
Several new questions have presented themselves following the Court’s
decision in Endrew F. First, the three opinions discussed above confirmed
Endrew F.’s acknowledgement that the creation of an IEP is a “‘factintensive exercise’ and that it ‘will be informed not only by the expertise of
school officials, but also by the input of the child’s parents or guardians.’” 118
These district courts highlighted Endrew F.’s contention that “the IEP must
be evaluated through the lens of the student’s ‘present level of achievement,
disability, and potential for growth.’” 119 But this inquiry will likely differ
depending on the court’s particular expectations of a child with disabilities
based on his or her circumstances—Endrew F. even acknowledges that there
are infinite variations about what is obtainable for students. 120 Therefore,
establishing a fact-based inquiry to determine what reasonably constitutes
appropriate progress in these decisions presents possible issues for district
courts moving forward.
Furthermore, after Rowley and Endrew F., it is still unclear how much
deference a court should give school administrators. While Rowley

113
114

34.

115

Id. at *13.
For further discussion of the due process proceedings outlined under the IDEA, see supra note

Parker C., 2017 WL 2888573, at *7.
Id.
117 Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 992 (2017) (quoting Endrew F. v.
Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015)).
118 Paris Sch. Dist. v. A.H., No. 2:15-CV-02197, 2017 WL 1234151, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 2017)
(quoting Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999); see also Parker C., 2017 WL 2888573, at *6 (“[S]chool districts
must work with parents to design an IEP . . . . The instruction offered must be specially designed to meet
a child’s unique needs.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bd. of Educ. v. Maez, No. 16-CV-1082,
2017 WL 3278945, at *14 (D.N.M. Aug. 1, 2017) (“The Supreme Court in Endrew F. recently reiterated
that the adequacy of an IEP turns on the unique attributes of the child for which it is created.”).
119 Maez, 2017 WL 3278945, at *14 (quoting Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999).
120 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
116
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acknowledged that courts should defer to school administrators on
“questions of methodology”—the specific educational tactics being
utilized 121—it did not mandate that courts defer on the question of whether a
particular IEP appropriately provides a FAPE. 122 The Court in Endrew F.
stated that lower courts should defer to school authorities based on their
expertise and exercise of judgment yet declined to elaborate on what
appropriate progress would look like from case to case. 123 In the same
paragraph, however, the Court lauded the procedural nature of the IEP
process and the reviewing authority’s ability to evaluate “cogent and
responsive explanations” for decisions made by a school district. 124 This
ambiguity may ultimately cause courts to differ on the level of deference
they provide to school administrators, which would produce different
outcomes across jurisdictions despite similar facts being presented in any
given case.
Finally, the limited district court cases decided so far have interpreted
Endrew F.’s language differently. There is a possible split emerging among
the circuits that previously followed the “some educational benefit” standard,
especially in light of the fact that these courts are trying to reconcile the
Endrew F. standard with its Rowley precedent. While some courts have
found that Endrew F. overruled Rowley and requires a heightened
standard, 125 others are still using the “some educational benefit” language,
indicating that the decision has not altered their fact-specific evaluation. 126
In contrast, other courts have found that Endrew F.’s appropriate progress
standard does not alter Rowley’s “meaningful educational benefit” test.127
121 See Terry Jean Seligmann, Rowley Comes Home to Roost: Judicial Review of Autism Special
Education Disputes, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 217, 233 (2005) (stating that courts do not possess
specialized knowledge and expertise to resolve educational policy questions and thus must defer to states
on preferable educational methods).
122 Dixie Snow Huefner, Judicial Review of the Special Education Program Requirements Under the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act: Where Have We Been and Where Should We Be Going?,
14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 483, 504 (1991) (“What Rowley commands, however, is deference to the
school authorities on questions of methodology and policy, not on questions of whether an IEP constitutes
a FAPE.” (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted)).
123 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001.
124 Id. at 1002.
125 See Paris Sch. Dist. v. A.H., No. 2:15-CV-02197, 2017 WL 1234151, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 3,
2017) (“In comparing [the Endrew F. standard] to the ‘merely more than de minimis’ test—previously
the law of the Eighth Circuit—the Court held that ‘this standard is markedly more demanding.’” (quoting
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000)).
126 See Bd. of Educ. v. Maez, No. 16-CV-1082, 2017 WL 3278945, at *8 (D.N.M. Aug. 1, 2017)
(noting that the IEP was “appropriately ambitious and likely to provide [the student] with some
educational benefit in light of his unique circumstances”).
127 See, e.g., Parker C. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., No. CV 16-4836, 2017 WL 2888573, at *7
(E.D. Pa. July 6, 2017) (declining to address whether the hearing officer applied the incorrect standard
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Incorporating the “meaningful educational benefit” standard to evaluate the
FAPE standard is questionable, however, given that Endrew F. never
explicitly mentions “meaningful educational benefit,” nor did the opinion
choose to adopt either standard utilized by district courts following Rowley
or offered by either party at oral argument. 128 These cases demonstrate the
varying impact of Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard on courts’
evaluation of what constitutes a FAPE and may indicate how this divergence
will develop in the future. 129
III. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE ENDREW F. STANDARD
Despite the fact-specific nature of the FAPE standard, district courts all
agree that Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard now requires that an
IEP’s educational benefit be “more demanding than the ‘merely more than
de minimis’ test.” 130 Additionally, since Endrew F., there has been an
emphasis on meeting specific requirements highlighted in the Endrew F.
opinion—namely, that in order to guarantee that a student receives a FAPE,
school districts must provide students with disabilities individualized
accommodations, include special education students in general education
classrooms, and make decisions about an IEP using cogent analysis.131 As a
result, Endrew F.’s heightened standard for a FAPE should lead to
significant changes for both special education students and schools—
because he applied the “meaningful educational benefit” standard, which remains valid in light of Endrew
F.).
128 Janet R. Decker & Sarah Hurwitz, Post-Endrew Legal Implications for Students with Autism
Introduction, 344 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 31, 35 (2017) (acknowledging that “[t]he Endrew Court
resolved the split in the circuits not by adopting one of these [conflicting] standards, but by creating a
new standard”).
129 Maureen MacFarlane, legal counsel for Cambridge Public Schools in Massachusetts, even went
so far as to say that “[o]ne might posit that based upon the cases that have been issued to date there is
likely to be, over time, another split in the circuits as to how to interpret the standard[] that ha[s] been
articulated in . . . Endrew.” Maureen A. MacFarlane, In Search of the Meaning of an “Appropriate
Education”: Ponderings on the Fry and Endrew Decisions, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 539, 557 (2017).
130 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 992 (quoting Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329,
1338 (10th Cir. 2015)); see also JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, Endrew
Decision Creates Important New Opportunities for Students with Disabilities, COUNCIL OF PARENT
ATT’YS & ADVOCS. (Sept. 2017), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.copaa.org/resource/resmgr/docs/
accessible_2017/Endrew_paper_LH__9-8-17-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YCQ2-4RR3] (“Endrew rejects the
bigotry of low expectations that marked prior interpretations of Rowley. It requires that schools provide
special education that is designed to help students with disabilities become academically
proficient . . . .”).
131 See Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000 (“[A] FAPE will involve integration in the regular classroom
and individualized special education calculated to achieve advancement from grade to grade.”); id. at
1002 (“A reviewing court may fairly expect [school] authorities to be able to offer a cogent and responsive
explanation for their decisions that shows the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to make
progress appropriate in light of his circumstances.”).
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especially for those residing in circuits that previously followed the “some
educational benefit” standard. 132 For one, this new standard provides special
education students with much-needed resources that will assist them in
further developing their academic, social, and behavioral skills. 133 Many of
these children had been neglected by the policies and programs instituted at
their schools in jurisdictions that previously utilized the de minimis standard.
Under the Court’s new standard, school districts and administrators will now
have to provide these students with enhanced individualized curricula,
supplemental aids, and other important resources. 134
While the new standard does appear to increase the protections for
students with disabilities, it also should have a significant impact on school
structuring and the resources that are allocated to other students. Because the
Court raised the FAPE standard above the de minimis threshold, it is
probable that certain school districts will now have to significantly alter their
existing programming, and school administrators will be forced to make
difficult decisions about how to allocate their already-limited resources in
order to adequately fund the programming and resources that Endrew F.
requires.
This Part analyzes these issues further by highlighting the areas of
education most likely to be impacted by the Endrew F. decision: the
integration of students with disabilities into general education classrooms,
resource allocation within public schools, and the role of charter schools in
providing education to children with special needs.

132 See Julie Waterstone, Endrew F., Symbolism v. Reality, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 527, 532 (2017) (“For
those children with special needs living in the Tenth Circuit, they will unquestionably feel a difference
because their quality of program has been elevated through this decision.”). While the IDEA already
required, and schools already provided, some of the programs and services discussed in this Part to some
extent, it is probable that the heightened FAPE standard will force more schools to implement the policies
outlined in this Part; otherwise, schools increase the risk of facing lawsuits. See Terry Jean Seligmann,
Flags on the Play: The Supreme Court Takes the Field to Enforce the Rights of Students with Disabilities,
46 J.L. & EDUC. 479, 481 (2017) (“For those school districts and courts, however, that have relied on a
narrow reading of Rowley to claim that their IDEA obligations are only procedural or that courts should
avoid any substantive review of the validity of a school district’s proposed individualized education plan
(IEP), Endrew F. has blown the whistle and offered an invigorated version of Rowley to guide future
FAPE dispute resolution.”).
133 See JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 130 (“For the many
students with disabilities who have fallen far behind their peers academically due to inadequate special
education or other reasons, Endrew requires that schools help them catch up.”); Claire Raj & Emily Suski,
Endrew F.’s Unintended Consequences, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 499, 502 (2017) (noting that the standard the
Supreme Court set forth for determining FAPE “undoubtedly marks a victory for students with disabilities
and is markedly better than the ‘more than de minimis’ standard it rejected”).
134 See infra Sections III.A–C.
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A. Integrating Students with Disabilities into General
Education Classrooms
One way Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard will significantly
affect the development of students with disabilities is by explicitly ensuring
that students with disabilities advance while being fully integrated into
general education classrooms. This new standard seems to create a high
presumption in favor of IEPs that focus on “mainstreaming” 135 the student
and ensuring individual progress in the general education curriculum, instead
of primarily in special education classrooms. 136 The opinion’s emphasis on
this point serves as a reaffirmation of the IDEA’s mandate that school
districts should guarantee that each child with a disability receives his or her
educational services in the least restrictive environment (LRE). 137
This presumption in favor of integrating students with disabilities into
general education will presumably carry with it significant costs to schools
and school districts, including the costs of administering educational
programs specific to each child’s circumstances in general education
classrooms. 138 For example, schools may have to expand the use of
supplemental aids and services in these classrooms in order to provide
students with disabilities the opportunity to make appropriate progress.139
135 “Mainstreaming” is a common term used in education to describe the integration of students with
disabilities into a general education classroom. See Mainstreaming, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/mainstreaming [https://perma.cc/J2SR-XX3D].
136 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000 (“The IEP provisions [of the IDEA] reflect Rowley’s expectation
that, for most children, a FAPE will involve integration in the regular classroom and individualized
special education calculated to achieve advancement from grade to grade. . . . When a child is fully
integrated in the regular classroom, as the Act prefers, what that typically means is providing a level of
instruction reasonably calculated to permit advancement through the general curriculum.”); see also
Spencer J. Salend & Laurel M. Garrick Duhaney, The Impact of Inclusion on Students with and Without
Disabilities and Their Educators, 20 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 114, 115 (1999) (citing a study that
found that students with disabilities who were integrated into general education classes were more likely,
as compared to those children with disabilities who were not enrolled in general education classes, to
attend postsecondary academic programs, obtain employment and earn higher salaries, live
independently, be socially integrated into their communities, and be married or engaged).
137 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2012). For a discussion of the IDEA’s LRE mandate, see supra Section
I.A.
138 See LISSA A. POWER-DEFUR & FRED P. ORELOVE, INCLUSIVE EDUCATION: PRACTICAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT 68–71 (1997); Therese Craparo, Note,
Remembering the “Individuals” of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 467, 494 (2003) (noting that school districts often argue that the costs of providing
supplemental services necessary to include a child with disabilities in a general education classroom are
too high); Kevin D. Stanley, Note, A Model for Interpretation of Mainstreaming Compliance Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Board of Education v. Holland, 65 UMKC L. REV. 303, 317
(1996) (explaining that services for mainstreamed students may result in a reallocation of school funds).
139 See Megan Roberts, Comment, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Why
Considering Individuals One at a Time Creates Untenable Situations for Students and Educators,
55 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1054 (2008) (“[F]undamentally the LRE is meant to be the environment in which
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Additionally, schools may have to hire more support staff that can be
incorporated into general education classrooms periodically throughout the
school day. 140
Despite these costs and impacts on school operations, however, the
implementation of mainstreaming practices emphasized in the Endrew F.
opinion are likely to have a positive effect on students with disabilities. The
majority of studies on mainstreaming show that the placement of students
with disabilities in general education classrooms more positively affects their
academic achievement compared to their placement in separate special
education classes. 141 These studies show that mainstreaming encourages
development by exposing students with disabilities to the mainstream
curriculum, which challenges these students in a way that one-on-one
instruction does not. 142 Mainstreaming also allows these students to observe
how other students learn, which can help boost language and problemsolving skills. 143
Incorporating children with disabilities into general education
classrooms can also have a positive impact on the social development of
other students. First, mainstreaming promotes diversity within a classroom
that would not be available in different circumstances.144 Additionally,
interactions with other students can improve self-esteem in children with
disabilities as well as improve their active listening abilities and general
a student, with essential supplemental aids and services, can benefit from academic and social
opportunities.”).
140 See Rebecca Beitsch, Special Education Case at Supreme Court Could Prove Costly for Schools,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2016, 11:05 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/special-educationcase-at-supreme-court-could-prove_us_584983dae4b07d4bc0fa2561[https://perma.cc/X73S-Y3HR]
(“Disability groups that have sided with Endrew . . . say a win for their side could encourage schools to
improve their special education programs, perhaps by hiring people and using technology that can provide
more therapy . . . .”).
141 See, e.g., Nancy A. Madden & Robert E. Slavin, Mainstreaming Students with Mild Handicaps:
Academic and Social Outcomes, 53 REV. EDUC. RES. 519, 523–26 (1983) (analyzing various studies that
demonstrate more academic growth for students with disabilities who were mainstreamed than those in
self-contained classrooms); Salend & Duhaney, supra note 136, at 114–16 (same).
142 See Salend & Duhaney, supra note 136, at 114–16.
143 See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1047–48 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that
language and behavior models taught to others may help with the development of children with
disabilities); Jeff Grabmeier, Children with Disabilities Benefit from Classroom Inclusion, OHIO ST. U.
(July 29, 2014, 3:37 PM), https://ehe.osu.edu/news/listing/children-disabilities-benefit-classroominclusion [https://perma.cc/Q5V3-XKLE] (citing a study that found that students with disabilities “get a
big boost” in their language skills when they interact with other children with good language skills).
144 See Lorna Idol, Towards Inclusion of Special Education Students in General Education: A
Program Evaluation of Eight Schools, 27 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 77, 91 (2006) (finding that
educators had generally favorable impressions of the impact of students with disabilities on other students
in their class and vice versa); Stanley, supra note 138, at 316 (“Without question, the great weight of
evidence points to the positive effects of diversity within the regular classroom.”).
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social skills. 145 Ultimately, while Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard
and emphasis on LREs may significantly impact the structure of certain
schools, it should also help foster further academic and social growth among
students with disabilities as well as other students in the general education
classroom.
B. Impact on Public School Operations and Spending
Endrew F.’s heightened FAPE standard should have a significant
impact on public school administrators, teachers, and students. In order to
abide by this new standard, schools may have to provide more individualized
assistance to students with disabilities, which will, in turn, impact day-today school operations, teachers’ professional development, and resource
allocation schoolwide. While these changes are likely to affect traditional
public schools more generally, they will probably have an even greater
impact on public charter schools due to their funding issues, unique
structures, and alternative teaching methods, as compared to traditional
public schools. This Section further examines these impacts by first
surveying the most plausible ways the Endrew F. holding will alter
traditional public schools and then evaluating how the new standard
specifically affects public charter schools.
1. General Impact on Public Schools
The appropriate progress standard will likely have a positive effect on
students with disabilities enrolled in traditional public schools by facilitating
the provision of more supplemental, individualized aid and a curriculum that
is more accommodating to their needs. However, in order for students with
disabilities to receive these benefits, teachers will likely need additional
educational assistance to better understand the best methods to educate
them. 146 This Section discusses how the appropriate progress standard, and
the Court’s requirement that a student’s IEP allow for an educational benefit

145

See William R. Henninger, IV & Sarika S. Gupta, How Do Children Benefit from Inclusion, in
FIRST STEPS TO PRESCHOOL INCLUSION: HOW TO JUMPSTART YOUR PROGRAMWIDE PLAN 33, 37–43
(2014) (highlighting the short- and long-term benefits of inclusion); Stanley, supra note 138, at 314
(highlighting the nonacademic benefits of mainstreaming).
146 See generally Mitchell L. Yell & David F. Bateman, Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District
(2017): FAPE and the U.S. Supreme Court, 50 TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 7 (2017)
(acknowledging that, under this new standard, teachers must better understand the legal implications of
special education, the procedures and strategies for effectively incorporating special education students
into the general education curriculum, how to develop measurable annual goals for students with
disabilities, and how to monitor those goals using objective data).
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that is more demanding than the “merely more than de minimis” test, should
affect the daily lives of teachers and students. 147
Meeting the Endrew F. FAPE standard ultimately makes general and
special education teachers, school support staff, and administrators more
accountable by requiring them to develop differentiated curricula to help
students with disabilities make appropriate progress. 148 This standard may
have the greatest impact on general education teachers, who must now
familiarize themselves with the needs of students with disabilities. 149 Some
scholars note that Endrew F. will probably lead to a higher volume of
professional development in evidenced-based teaching practices for both
general and special education teachers so that these educators will have the
knowledge necessary to create an individualized special education for
students with disabilities. 150 This programming may include incorporating
new technology, workbooks, and other teaching objects into the classroom
to help facilitate learning151 and will allow teachers to master the tools
147 Of course, the potential changes to the daily lives of teachers and students after Endrew F. will
depend on the quality of special education classrooms across districts, but those who previously followed
the “some educational benefit” (de minimis) standard are likely to experience the biggest changes. See
Understanding the Supreme Court Decision on Students with Disabilities: An Interview with Natasha
Strassfeld, N.Y.U. STEINHARDT NEWS (June 19, 2017), http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/site/ataglance/2017/06/
understanding-the-supreme-court-decision-on-students-with-disabilities-an-interview-with-natashastrassfeld.html [https://perma.cc/7JRJ-S49U] (“If a school district maintains fidelity to IDEA’s objective
of providing a free, appropriate public education to a student with a disability, then Endrew changes very
little for the day-to-day life of the classroom teacher.”).
148 See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000 (2017) (requiring school
districts to provide students with disabilities “individualized special education calculated to achieve
advancement from grade to grade” in order to satisfy the FAPE standard); see also H. Rutherford Turnbull
et al., The Supreme Court, Endrew, and the Appropriate Education of Students with Disabilities,
84 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 124, 136 (2018) (“[E]ducators of these students will need to have knowledge of
a broad range of academic as well as functional curricula. . . . And they will need to have the depth of
understanding of curricula, academic as well as functional, to effectively modify and assess progress in
those curricula for students with disabilities.”); Linda Diamond, Decoding the Impact of the Supreme
Court Decision on Special Education, CONSORTIUM ON READING EXCELLENCE IN EDUC. (May 19, 2017),
https://www.corelearn.com/special-ed-blog [https://perma.cc/YAN7-FSHL] (“Because of the Supreme
Court’s ruling, districts will want to equip special education and regular education teachers with the skills
and knowledge to be able to teach all students to a higher level. This will require better and deeper
professional development in evidence-based teaching practices . . . . It will require selecting and fully
implementing the best curricula for all students as well as the most effective materials for teaching
students already identified with disabilities.”).
149 See Decker & Hurwitz, supra note 128, at 40 (“[S]chool leaders must ensure employees receive
effective training in autism, both to be prepared for potential legal challenges and to meet the individual
needs of the growing number of students with autism.”).
150 See id. Through these programs, teachers will learn how to both set up programs to regularly
monitor student progress and use new resources and materials to respond to these interventions. See id.
151 Michael L. Wehmeyer at al., Technology Use by Students with Intellectual Disabilities: An
Overview, 19 J. SPECIAL EDUC. TECH. 7 (2004) (highlighting the importance and different types of
technological supplements included into special education curricula in order to assist students).
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necessary to create a curriculum that encourages individual growth in an
inclusive classroom setting. 152
It is probable that the Endrew F. standard will also impact the
administrative demands of educating a student with a disability. Some
commentators argue that Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard now
mandates that all participants in a child’s IEP meeting evaluate the merits of
the IEP with increased scrutiny. 153 The burden ultimately falls on both
general and special education teachers to fully understand the potential
complications of a specific disability and how it impacts an individual
student’s academic, social, and functional progress. 154 Using this
information, educators and parents must work together to configure a proper
IEP and then monitor the progress of the student throughout the year to
ensure that the interventions are sufficient. 155 To assist in this process,
schools may now be more inclined to enlist the services of disability
education experts to assess the adequacy of an IEP and help teachers
implement proper interventions.156 Scholars also anticipate that, following
the implementation of this new standard, school districts will listen to and
coordinate with parents before and during these meetings even more than
before. 157
152 Melissa Hecht, What the Endrew F. Supreme Court Case Means for Public Education, RELIAS
(May 22, 2017), https://www.relias.com/blog/what-the-endrew-f-case-means-for-public-education
[https://perma.cc/8ARG-7EPG] (“All school staff must have the tools and professional development
necessary to create an inclusive classroom where all students, including students with disabilities, can
meet their educational goals.”).
153 See, e.g., Decker & Hurwitz, supra note 128, at 40 (stating that IEP teams are mandated to
“carefully scrutinize segregated placements including self-contained classrooms and alternative
educational settings”); Michelle Diament, Supreme Court FAPE Ruling May Be a Watershed Moment,
DISABILITY SCOOP (April 7, 2017), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2017/04/07/supreme-court-fapewatershed/23553 [https://perma.cc/6LKE-7F8R] (providing a statement from the School Superintendents
Association suggesting that districts must “make sure that they can provide ‘a cogent and responsive
explanation’ for the IEPs they produce, particularly for students who are not expected to perform on
grade-level” (quoting Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1002)).
154 See Hecht, supra note 152 (explaining how, by setting out a legal precedent that millions of
students deserve an “appropriately ambitious” education, the Court is requiring that “[a]ll school staff—
administrators, general education teachers, special education teachers, and paraprofessionals—must
understand how to create and implement an effective and ambitious IEP”).
155 Shawn K. O’Brien, Did Endrew F. Change the “A” in FAPE? Questions and Implications for
School Psychologists, 46 COMMUNIQUÉ 31 (2017).
156 See Beitsch, supra note 140 (stating that the Endrew F. decision may encourage schools to
improve their special education programs by hiring experts, utilizing technology that can provide more
therapy, or sending existing staff to more training).
157 See Waterstone, supra note 132, at 532–33 (noting that the Court’s repeated emphasis on
procedures for parents and educators to collaborate together is expected to lead to more parent
involvement in the IEP process); Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District: Academic Achievement
& Students with Disabilities, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 23, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/cle/materials/2017/05/ce1705asd.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88FD-
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Finally, the appropriate progress standard should have a significant
impact on the utilization of special education teachers and support staff,
including the need for more special education support staff to “push into” the
general education classroom or “pull out” students into a self-contained
classroom throughout the school day. 158 Raising the FAPE standard above
the de minimis threshold means that schools residing in these districts must
also provide more specialized programs for those who need them. Thus,
students who struggle with mental or emotional disabilities are now more
likely to receive counseling or a behavior modification program provided by
disability specialists.159 Additionally, children with physical problems ought
to gain access to special equipment or physical and occupational therapy
sessions during the school day. 160
While all of these additional resources and programs appear very
beneficial for facilitating student growth, critics of the Endrew F. standard
worry about the costs of these increased inventions,161 especially given that
school districts already do not receive sufficient funding from the federal
government to address the needs of students with disabilities.162 For example,

LVGX] (“Advocates argue that one major anticipated change will be that when parents are at IEP
meetings with the school district, the school will be more willing to listen to parents and give students
more of what they need up front.”).
158 In education, a “push in” model refers to a system in which aides or specialists enter the general
education classroom to assist a special education student within that environment, while “pull out”
services are those where an aide or specialist works with a student outside of the general education
classroom. See Brain Adom, Pull Out and Push In Models in Special Education, MEDIUM (Apr. 22, 2016),
https://medium.com/@brainadom895/pull-out-and-push-in-models-in-special-education-d1c8d9ceea13
[https://perma.cc/WH7J-BKGE].
159 See Holly T. Howell, Comment, Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District: How Much Benefit
is Enough When Evaluating the Educational Needs of Disabled Students in Federally-Funded Public
Schools?, 40 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 347, 352 (2016).
160 Id.
161 During oral argument in Endrew F., Justice Kennedy expressed concerns about the costs
associated with a program that is reasonably calculated to provide students with disabilities educational
opportunities that are “substantially equal” to those offered to other students. Howe, supra note 99; see
also Howell, supra note 159, at 413 (noting the author’s expectation that the Endrew F. decision will be
costly to school districts).
162 See Kathleen Conn, Rowley and Endrew F.: Discerning the Outer Bounds of FAPE?, 345 WEST’S
EDUC. L. REP. 597, 613 (2017) (“The costs of providing a FAPE for . . . severely disabled children are
not adequately reimbursed by the federal government under IDEA. The federal government never made
good on its promise to provide 40% of special education expenditures to school districts. At the present
time, the federal government covers only 16% of the costs of providing special education services under
IDEA.”). This funding issue is exacerbated in school districts that provide services to children with
disabilities through private institutions. For instance, Endrew’s private school tuition was $70,000 per
year, while Colorado school districts spent an average of $8985 per student. Id. (citing Education
Spending Per Student Per State, GOVERNING: STATES & LOCALITIES, http://www.governing.com/govdata/education-data/state-education-spending-per-pupil-data.html [https://perma.cc/7RNZ-NS56]). If a
school cannot accommodate a student’s needs because it lacks the resources necessary to ensure that the
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school districts may incur a variety of additional academic costs for
differentiated instructional tools and workbooks, professional development
for teachers, technology, and new curricula. Additionally, the provision of
counseling, behavioral modification programs, and physical and occupation
therapy sessions requires the services of costly specialists. 163 Finally, schools
are likely to incur various administrative expenses, including the costs
associated with hiring disability education experts who can assess an IEP’s
adequacy or testify about education plans for children if those plans are
challenged in court. 164
2. Impact on Charter Schools
Like traditional public schools, charter schools must also comply with
federal special education laws. 165 Thus, it would seem that the Endrew F.
decision will cause charter schools to experience the same effects
experienced by traditional public schools, including the provision of more
resources to students with disabilities by their respective schools. However,
charter schools differ from traditional public schools in that they experience
more funding deficiencies, have unique organizational structures, and utilize
alterative teaching methods. 166 All of these factors together possibly make it
child will make appropriate progress, the school may be required to pay for outside private schooling,
where tuition could cost above $50,000 per year. Id.
163 Howell, supra note 159, at 352.
164 Beitsch, supra note 140 (“Advocates for administrators said schools likely would be forced to
boost spending on lawyers and disability education experts to testify about education plans for children,
as they try to fight off cases from parents seeking more therapy or private school tuition for their child.”).
165 Robert A. Garda, Jr., Disabled Students’ Rights of Access to Charter Schools Under the IDEA,
Section 504 and the ADA, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 516, 519 (2012) (“Charter schools
operate free from many of the local and state regulations that apply to traditional public schools. But
charter schools must comply with the federal laws governing disabled students—the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act . . ., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act . . . and Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.”).
166 Some commenters note that charter schools have unfavorably impacted students with disabilities
in the past primarily because they are underfunded, see, e.g., Robert A. Garda, Jr., Culture Clash: Special
Education in Charter Schools, 90 N.C. L. REV. 655, 691 (2012) (“Lacking such basic services for disabled
students precludes charter schools from being a viable school option for most disabled students.”), and
they cannot provide adequate programming or support for these students, see, e.g., Cheryl M. Lange &
Camilla A. Lehr, Charter Schools and Students with Disabilities: Parent Perceptions of Reasons for
Transfer and Satisfaction with Services, 21 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 141, 146–49 (2000) (providing
anecdotes from scholars and parents of students with special needs about the issues with delivery and
outcomes for these students who attend charter schools); Michael A. Naclerio, Note, Accountability
Through Procedure? Rethinking Charter School Accountability and Special Education Rights,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1174–75 (2017) (providing an example of a parent from New Orleans—whose
child had autism, blindness, and a developmental delay—who found that only one of the eight publicly
funded charter schools she met with had a program that could accommodate her son). Despite these issues,
enrollment by special needs students in charter schools has increased in recent years, see Lauren Morando
Rhim et al., Key Trends in Special Education in Charter Schools: A Secondary Analysis of the Civil Rights
CENTER
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even more difficult for charter schools to accommodate students with
disabilities. This Section explains these difficulties in more detail and
outlines why the Endrew F. holding may actually decrease the enrollment of
students with disabilities in charter schools.
Charter schools receive their initial charter from their respective local
boards of education and depend on their students receiving adequate yearly
achievement scores in order to renew their charters. 167 Like public schools,
charter schools receive government funding. 168 But charter schools differ
from traditional public schools in that they retain significant discretion
regarding teaching methods, curricula, and the general school structure, so
long as their students achieve satisfactory academic outcomes. 169 Charter
schools also differ in the amount of government resources they receive—
these schools are only funded at approximately 64% the rate of their public
school district counterparts nationwide. 170
These limited resources ultimately make it difficult for charter schools
to adequately accommodate students with disabilities. In the past, certain
charter schools have even been found to specifically disregard students with
complex cognitive and behavioral disabilities, perhaps due to the high costs
of providing these services. 171 As highlighted in the previous Section,
CHARTER SCHS. (Oct. 2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52feb326e4b069fc72abb0c8/t/
567b0a3640667a31534e9152/1450904118101/crdc_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5R5-WKSE], and the
Trump Administration has promoted and increased funding for school choice and the charter school
movement, arguing that it can benefit students with disabilities, Aria Bendix, Trump’s Education Budget
Revealed, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/03/trumpseducation-budget-revealed/519837 [https://perma.cc/V9RJ-JZPS]; Maria Danilova, Do Charter Schools
Serve Special-Needs Kids? The Jury is Out, SEATTLE TIMES (published May 22, 2017, 12:56 AM;
updated May 22, 2017, 6:18 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nation-politics/do-charterschools-serve-special-needs-kids-the-jury-is-out [https://perma.cc/A2UB-M4N8].
167 Naclerio, supra note 166, at 1162–63; see also Julie F. Mead, Devilish Details: Exploring
Features of Charter School Statutes that Blur the Public/Private Distinction, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 349,
372 (2003) (noting that student performance standards are one of the most common measures states take
into consideration when deciding whether or not to renew a school’s charter). Some states, such as
Louisiana, even condition renewal of charter schools based on student improvement on standardized test
scores. Id.
168 See Jeanette M. Curtis, Note, A Fighting Chance: Inequities in Charter School Funding and
Strategies for Achieving Equal Access to Public School Funds, 55 HOW. L.J. 1057, 1067–68 (2012)
(explaining that, although charter schools may receive private grants and loans, most of their funding
comes from federal, state, and local government sources).
169 Id. at 1064.
170 Just the FAQs – Charter Schools, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, https://www.edreform.com/2012/03/
just-the-faqs-charter-schools [https://perma.cc/B5UT-ECDU] (reporting that charter schools average
$7131 per pupil compared to the per pupil expenditure of $11,184 in traditional public schools).
171 See Garda, Jr., supra note 166, at 687–88 (stating that some charter schools are dissuading
students with severe disabilities—such as autism, traumatic brain injury, or hearing, visual, or orthopedic
impairments—from enrolling in their schools because of “cost and accountability concerns”); Nancy J.
Zollers & Arun K. Ramanathan, For-Profit Charter Schools and Students with Disabilities: The Sordid
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Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard will likely increase the amount of
resources required to provide disabled students with a FAPE. As a result,
charter schools may be required to reallocate funds from general education
programs in order to support students with disabilities. However,
administrators of these schools will probably be hesitant to redistribute their
already-limited resources—as mentioned previously, charter schools depend
on adequate yearly achievement scores to renew their charters, 172 and charter
school administrators are unlikely to remove their already-scarce resources
from general education classrooms in fear that doing so may lead to a decline
in the schools’ overall test scores. 173 Furthermore, if school administrators
decide not to reallocate these resources to assist children with disabilities,
these students may decide not to enroll in charter schools at all. The
heightening of the FAPE standard post-Endrew F. is therefore likely to create
new tensions for charter schools.
Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that Endrew F.’s heightened
requirements will exacerbate the underenrollment of students with
disabilities in charter schools—especially considering that the additional
protections afforded under the appropriate progress standard clash with
teaching methods and school operating procedures employed by many
charter schools. Commentators note that the charter school movement is
motivated by the ideas of deregulation and academic outcome
accountability. 174 Over time, in order to achieve the state-mandated academic
benchmarks, multiple charter schools have developed a “no excuses” model
Side of the Business of Schooling, 80 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 297, 298 (1998) (“While they have done a
decent job of including students with mild disabilities, for-profit charter schools in Massachusetts have
engaged in a pattern of disregard and often blatant hostility toward students with more complicated
behavioral and cognitive disabilities.”).
172 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
173 Prior to the Endrew F. decision, scholars noted that “the administrators and teachers that serve
[charter] schools often prioritize test scores and financial considerations over legal and moral obligations
to appropriately accommodate and include students with [disabilities].” Stern et al., The Normative Limits
of Choice: Charter Schools, Disability Studies, and Questions of Inclusion, 29 EDUC. POL’Y 448, 456
(2015). Given that the Endrew F. holding will likely require even more resources to be devoted to students
with disabilities, it is reasonable to assume that these issues will only be exacerbated.
174 See, e.g., Leman Kaniturk Kose, Challenges of Charter Schools with Special Education: Issues
of Concern for Charter School Authorizers and Service Providers, 1 MID-ATLANTIC EDUC. REV. 36, 38
(2013) (noting that “[c]harter operators who are intentionally avoiding bureaucracy may find it hard to
understand that failing to follow procedural rules could amount to failing to provide an appropriate
education for students with disabilities”); Garda, Jr., supra note 166, at 660–61 (“The charter movement
is rooted in the exchange of autonomy and independence for educational results. Regulators judge charter
schools by the performance of their students, not adherence to mandatory processes. As famously stated
by President Clinton, they are ‘schools that have no rules.’” (quoting October 6, 1996 Debate Transcript:
The First Clinton-Dole Presidential Debate, COMM’N PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES (Oct. 6, 1996),
http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-6-1996-debate-transcript
[https://perma.cc/L65D22K3])).
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that encourages strict discipline policies so that students would focus solely
on their schoolwork, in addition to longer school days, heavier workloads,
and an extended school year. 175 Moreover, several charter schools have
structured their curricula in a way that maximizes the chances of students
achieving the highest collective test scores, even if that comes at the expense
of addressing individual needs outside of the tests. 176
Even before Endrew F., the strict, metric-driven philosophy of charter
schools was not very conducive to the individual, nuanced needs of students
with disabilities capable of functioning in general education classrooms. 177
Moreover, the independence given to these charter schools may conflict with
the procedural rights afforded to parents under the IDEA. 178 The Court’s
ruling in Endrew F. may aggravate these same concerns because the more
demanding substantive FAPE requirements conflict with typical charter
school operations. For instance, the appropriate progress standard’s
implications for least restrictive environments and more individualized
accommodations directly contrast with the strict discipline policies
administered by many charter schools. Additionally, charter schools’ focus
on academic outcome accountability clashes with the appropriate progress
standard, which is based on the student’s holistic needs—including
behavioral and social–emotional objectives—not just academic outcomes.
One example from Philadelphia illustrates this problem. Angelique D.
was enrolled in a distressed charter school that did not have the resources to
properly evaluate her or provide her with the supplemental aids necessary to

175

The debate over the “no excuses” model intensified recently when a video surfaced of a charter
school teacher berating a first grader for failing to explain a math problem correctly, ripping up the
student’s paper, and having the subdued student sit in the “calm down chair.” See Mark Palko & Andrew
Gelman, How Schools That Obsess About Standardized Tests Ruin Them as Measures of Success, VOX
(Aug. 16, 2016, 7:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/8/16/12482748/success-academy-schoolsstandardized-tests-metrics-charter [https://perma.cc/H4WW-ESU5]. While advocates argue that this
“educational tough love” encourages student growth, id., critics of charter schools argue that these
institutions achieve test results by recruiting the highest achieving students and weeding out
underperforming students through their rigid disciplinary codes. Naclerio, supra note 166, at 1161; see
also Evan Horowitz, Do Charter Schools Really Help Children Improve?, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 23, 2016),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/08/23/charter-schools-boost-test-scores-nothingelse/D6F7vTwLTqYnBJyeupoODK/story.html [https://perma.cc/2934-WUPX] (finding that the “no
excuses” charter school model does not translate into better job success).
176 See Palko & Gelman, supra note 175 (highlighting the case of Success Academy Charter Schools
in New York and how the data seems to show that the schools thrive by training the remainder of students
to perform well on performance tests and excluding those students who are not likely to perform well).
177 See Naclerio, supra note 166, at 1173–74.
178 See id. at 1183–84 (“[T]he absence of direct accountability avenues—like a publicly elected
school board—amplifies the problems with the procedures through which students with disabilities can
vindicate their rights [in charter schools] because such procedures become the only formal mechanism to
resolve disputes . . . .”).
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receive a FAPE under the appropriate progress standard. 179 After achieving
unsatisfactory test scores in previous years, the school was in danger of
losing its charter and thus forced to funnel all of its limited monetary and
curriculum resources into ensuring that students in general education
classrooms succeeded on their yearly achievement tests. Lost in the school’s
desperate attempts to maintain its charter was Angelique, who the court
determined should have received 1780.3 more hours of education services
from the school. 180
Now that charter schools will be forced to address disabled students’
needs so that they make more than de minimis progress, it is plausible that
many of these schools will experience more dilemmas like Angelique’s.
Although these students will still receive a better education than they
previously did at their respective public institutions, their choice in schools
may be limited even further than before. Ultimately, if these students do not
receive proper resources, they are faced with two undesirable choices: switch
schools or sue.
Overall, the Court’s creation of the appropriate progress standard in
Endrew F. is likely to have a substantial impact on various aspects of the
current education landscape. As a result, special education programs,
administrative proceedings, and professional development will significantly
change—to the benefit and detriment of different individuals within the
school system. This Part analyzed the probable impact the new standard will
have on general education integration programs, public school operations
and spending, and charter schools. However, the discussion provided here is
just the tip of the iceberg, and questions still remain regarding how Endrew
F. will impact education reform moving forward.
IV. CLARIFYING ENDREW F.’S APPROPRIATE PROGRESS STANDARD
While the appropriate progress standard serves as a preliminary step to
help protect the needs of special education students, the standard must be
clarified so that students, parents, and administrators better understand their
legal rights. Part II observed the wide-ranging interpretations of appropriate
progress among district courts since Endrew F. and how the ambiguous
standard has led to vastly different outcomes across jurisdictions. This Part
presents a solution to this issue by proposing a two-part test to assist courts

179

2018).

See Angelique D. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., No. 16-1179, 2018 WL 582757, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29,

180 Id. (awarding Angelique $71,212 in compensatory damages). The charter school closed in
December 2014, and Angelique subsequently enrolled in a Philadelphia public school. Id.
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in clarifying the FAPE standard. 181 In doing so, this Part proceeds by first
addressing the lingering issues following Endrew F., and then outlining the
proposed test and discussing objective criteria courts can use in determining
whether the two-part test has been met.
A. Lingering Issues Following Endrew F.
While courts and educators want some uniformity to ensure consistency
across jurisdictions, developing a FAPE standard for all students is
inherently difficult because no single standard easily applies to all children
with disabilities. 182 During Endrew F.’s oral argument, Justice Sotomayor
stated her belief that the IDEA provided the Court with enough to set a clear
standard but noted that the difficulty would be in finding a way to articulate
it. 183 The Endrew F. Court tried to simplify the existing standard by stating
that, in order to satisfy the IDEA’s FAPE requirement, an IEP must
contemplate more than a “de minimis educational benefit.” 184 But the opinion
did not clarify what it means to provide an “appropriately ambitious”
education program or “progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.” 185
181

For further discussion on why courts should clarify the interpretation of the FAPE standard, as
opposed to the Department of Education, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
182 See MacFarlane, supra note 129, at 555 (noting that courts have mostly shied away from defining
the term “appropriate education” apart from the standard articulated in Endrew F. because it is difficult
to articulate a nationwide definition when the IDEA is geared toward providing students with “specially
designed instruction” to meet their unique needs); Allan G. Osborne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo, Some
Educational Benefit or Meaningful Educational Benefit and Endrew F.: Is There a Difference or Is It the
Same Old Same Old?, 340 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1, 18 (2017) (“The bottom line is that no ‘one size fits
all’ standard can be crafted to apply easily to all children with disabilities.”).
183 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct.
988 (2017) (No. 15–827) https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15827_gfbh.pdf [https://perma.cc/VN2G-8XD4].
184 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000.
185 The United States Department of Education (DOE) provided some guidance on what is
considered appropriate progress following the Endrew F. decision. See Questions and Answers (Q&A)
on U.S. Supreme Court Case Decision Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District Re-1, U.S. DEPT. OF
EDUC.
(Dec.
7,
2017),
https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/qa-endrewcase-12-07-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7K7-5EMF]. The agency’s memorandum focuses on the IDEA’s procedural mandates
and defers the measure of appropriate progress and “challenging objectives” to local IEP teams. See id.
According to the DOE, IEP teams must now
implement policies, procedures and practices relating to (1) identifying present levels of academic
achievement and functional performance; (2) the setting of measurable annual goals, including
academic and functional goals; and (3) how a child’s progress toward meeting annual goals will be
measured and reported, so that the Endrew F. standard is met for each individual child with a
disability.
Id. The memorandum further discusses the importance of providing special education students with
supplemental aids and services as well as making “appropriate accommodations.” Id. Ultimately, while
the DOE’s memorandum provides a broad overview of the impact of Endrew F. on school districts, it
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Some scholars argue that the Court in Endrew F. merely reiterated what
was already articulated in Rowley—the idea that special education students
are not entitled to an equal educational opportunity. 186 Additionally, the
Court’s contention that the IDEA “requires an educational program
reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light
of the child’s circumstances” 187 closely tracks the language in the IDEA,
which states that “‘[f]ree appropriate public education’ means special
education and related services that . . . include an appropriate preschool,
elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved.” 188
Finally, the Court’s establishment of a standard that elaborates on the
meaning of the acronym FAPE using the word “appropriate” provides little
guidance as to what the term truly means in practice.189
B. Two-Part Test
The aforementioned ambiguity has left parents and school board
officials questioning how to apply the new standard in their schools. This
Section attempts to clarify this standard by addressing how courts should
assess whether an IEP would foster appropriate progress. It argues that, in
order to assess whether an IEP meets this standard, courts should apply a
two-part test. First, the court should examine whether the school district’s
procedures are adequate and will help institutions develop individualized
programs for students with disabilities. Second, the court should determine
whether the IEP substantively addresses the specific needs of the individual
student. This Section also proposes certain procedural and substantive
guideposts that courts may consider in their application of this two-part
test. 190 These procedural and substantive subfactors should be balanced and
weighed against each other in order to enable courts to consider the unique
circumstances associated with individual students while also allowing for
some consistency across different jurisdictions.

does not specify how school districts should best implement this standard, nor does it elaborate on how
courts should evaluate it.
186 Decker & Hurwitz, supra note 128, at 36.
187 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001.
188 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2012).
189 Conn, supra note 162, at 614 (further stating that “[e]xplaining a word by repeating the same
word is circular reasoning and unhelpful”).
190 These criteria largely come from advisory memoranda by the Department of Education offices in
Massachusetts and Vermont—the states that have provided the most additional guidance following
Endrew F.—as well as from education experts and existing case law. See, e.g., Memorandum from
Rebecca Holcombe, Sec’y of Educ., Vt. Agency of Educ., to Superintendents et al., FAPE Obligation
Under IDEA (July 27, 2017) [hereinafter Holcombe Memo], http://education.vermont.gov/sites/aoe/files/
documents/edu-memo-rh-regarding-fape-and-idea.pdf [https://perma.cc/48ZQ-LX7L].
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1. Part One: Adequacy of Procedure
In evaluating whether a particular IEP facilitates appropriate progress,
courts should first examine the adequacy of the school district’s procedures
for developing IEPs. In their evaluation, courts should examine the adequacy
of the resources the school uses to help formulate a student’s IEP goals, the
data collection procedures implemented by the school to help monitor
student progress, the school’s consultation with experts and the professional
development it offers both the general education and special education
teachers, and the methods the school institutes to provide students who have
disabilities with support, both behavioral and social–emotional.
The adequacy-of-procedure analysis should begin with an examination
of whether a school district uses proper measures and resources in
formulating a student’s IEP goals. For instance, courts may analyze whether
a school employed educational experts to independently evaluate the
sufficiency of the stated IEP goals as well as the proposed methodology to
be implemented by the teachers to help the student achieve these goals.191
Furthermore, courts should ensure that schools have procedures in place that
allow for the routine collection of data regarding a student’s academic and
behavior progress so that the IEP team will be able to make challenging, yet
realistic, goals for the student. 192
In addition to consulting with experts and using data to evaluate IEPs,
courts should also look at whether a school provides adequate guidance and
professional development to ensure that the teachers and schools
administering these interventions are qualified to address a student’s
individual needs. 193 This professional development should be geared
specifically toward teaching educators how to implement different strategies
191 See Raj & Suski, supra note 133, at 524 (“Expert opinions are central to any well-designed IEP.
When schools have well-trained and unbiased experts on staff who are able to contribute to IEP
development, the FAPE standard is likely met.”); Mitchell D. Chester, Advisory on Endrew F. v. Douglas
County School District RE-1, 2017 U.S. Supreme Court Decision of Special Education, MASS. DEP’T
ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC. (June 16, 2017), http://www.doe.mass.edu/lawsregs/advisory/20170616ieps.html [https://perma.cc/9N7V-DKVG] (discussing the Massachusetts Department of Elementary
& Secondary Education’s emphasis that Endrew F. highlights the importance of educational expertise in
the process of developing an IEP).
192 See Sharita Forrest, What Quality of Education Are Schools Required to Provide to Students with
Disabilities?, UNIV. OF ILL. NEWS BUREAU (Jan. 25, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://news.illinois.edu/blog/view/
6367/455713 [https://perma.cc/R6Y6-FZ6U] (recording that University of Illinois special education
professor James Shriner noted that schools must routinely collect data regarding the academic needs of
students with disabilities because “[w]ithout the data, you’re just making wild guesses” about what
constitutes appropriate progress).
193 Vermont is an example of a state that has provided exemplary guidance on the expectations of
qualified teachers. The state has used professional development training to help educators incorporate
unique procedures and practices into their classrooms as well as accommodate the specific academic
needs of special education students. See Holcombe Memo, supra note 190.
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throughout the class period; how to administer, interpret, and use periodic
assessments; and how to develop meaningful, measurable goals that will help
establish the success of certain interventions. 194 General and special
education teachers should also be instructed on the basics of education law
so that they can maintain proper protocol. 195
Finally, in determining whether a particular IEP will foster appropriate
progress, courts should assess whether the school district has established
procedures that provide students with behavioral and social–emotional
support, such as administering functional behavior assessments 196 and
evaluating the adequacy of behavior intervention plans. 197 Although recent
disability education laws, court cases, and professional opinions have
focused more on ensuring that students with disabilities achieve academic
improvements through their IEPs than achieve socioemotional
development, 198 for some special education students, receiving the proper
194 See Yell & Bateman, supra note 146, at 7–10 (outlining recommendations for teachers that would
ensure that their school districts are abiding by the Endrew F. standard).
195 See Holcombe Memo, supra note 190. While the Vermont State Department of Education’s
guidance would significantly improve special education, the current vast shortage of certified special and
general education teachers across the United States may make implementing these procedures difficult.
See Antonis Katsiyannis et al., Availability of Special Education Teachers: Trends and Issues,
24 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 246, 248 (2003). In California, for instance, school administrators
describe the need for these educators as “desperate,” leading to the creation of short-term programs that
do not spend sufficient time training special education teachers. Louis Freedberg & Theresa Harrington,
Special Education in “Deep Trouble” and Still Needs Reform, Says California Ed Board President,
EDSOURCE (Oct. 11, 2017), https://edsource.org/2017/california-education-board-president-says-specialed-in-deep-trouble-and-needs-reform/588436 [https://perma.cc/5MMW-52CX]. The issue is exacerbated
in charter schools, which are not obligated under the IDEA to meet certification requirements, leading to
a shortage of appropriately certified staff to deliver special education services. See Kose, supra note 174,
at 41. These training programs are expensive, and the cost will be magnified if educators are already
underqualified. Meeting Endrew F.’s appropriate progress standard, however, will require states to make
the same difficult decisions about resource allocation that Vermont did.
196 A functional behavioral assessment is “a systematic process of identifying the purpose—and more
specifically the function—of problem behaviors by investigating the preexisting environmental factors
that have served the purpose of these behaviors.” Zirkel, supra note 83, at 175 (citing Gregory P. Hanley
et al., Functional Analysis of Problem Behavior: A Review, 36 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 147 (2003);
Mark W. Steege & T. Steuart Watson, Best Practices in Functional Behavior Assessment, in 2 BEST
PRACTICES IN SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGY V 337 (Alex Thomas & Jeff Grimes eds., 2008)).
197 See Patrick Ober, Proactive Protection: How the IDEA Can Better Address the Behavioral
Problems of Children with Disabilities in Schools, 1 BELMONT L. REV. 311, 335 (2014) (proposing that
functional behavioral assessments and behavior interview plans be required in the IEPs of students with
disabilities because they will proactively address the behavior problems of these students). For more
information on behavior intervention plans, see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
198 See Kevin Golembiewski, Disparate Treatment and Lost Opportunity: Courts’ Approach to
Students with Mental Health Disabilities Under the IDEA, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 473, 485 (2016) (“Courts
frequently interpret ‘educational’ to mean ‘academic.’ Consequently, as long as a student is able to make
progress in traditional academic areas, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic, she will be denied services
even if she is not making progress in a number of areas that are critical to self-sufficiency.” (citing R.B.
v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2007))); Zirkel, supra note 83, at 209–10
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behavior management education is imperative to making academic
progress. 199 Thus, IEPs should incorporate adequate behavior services in
order to foster appropriate progress. 200 Ultimately, for courts to hold school
districts to the appropriate progress standard, they necessarily must examine
districts’ procedures.
2. Part Two: Adequacy of the IEP’s Substantive Goals
In addition to the procedural criteria discussed above, courts should also
examine the substantive goals of the individual child’s IEP in determining
whether the IEP will promote appropriate progress. The evaluation of the
substantive goals of a student with disabilities should assess whether the
school used an objective comparative analysis that scrutinizes a student’s
IEP compared with that student’s past performance, the IEPs of other
students, and different state and local educational standards; whether the IEP
contemplates the use of data and technology to enhance student learning; and
whether the school district implemented vocational assessments when
crafting IEPs for students who may not plan on attending college.
In its review, courts should first ensure that the IEP team, in its
development of an individual student’s IEP, considered past performance as
a benchmark in deciding whether the current IEP adequately fosters
appropriate progress. 201 Mere repetitions of goals and objectives from the
student’s previous IEPs should be considered “red flags.” 202 The language of
a child’s IEP must also be scrupulously compared to other students’ IEPs to

(highlighting that, since the 1997 IDEA Amendments, there has been a decrease in the professional push
for, as well as policymaking receptivity to, proactively ensuring that students with disabilities improve
their behavior; experts and lawmakers instead emphasize the importance of academic improvement for
special education students).
199 See Kathleen L. Lane et al., Serving Students with or At-Risk for Emotional and Behavior
Disorders: Future Challenges, 25 EDUC. & TREATMENT CHILD. 507, 511–12 (2002) (citing a study
suggesting that behavioral issues may result in academic underachievement); Craig F. Spiel et al.,
Evaluating the Content of Individualized Education Programs and 504 Plans of Youth Adolescents with
Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, 29 SCH. PSYCHOL. Q. 452, 452 (2014) (describing how students
with ADHD experience serious academic impairments because of their behavior).
200 JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 130. These programs
include positive behavioral interventions and supports as well as behavior intervention plans that help
special education students cope with the varying problems they experience each day.
201 Bill Crane, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Endrew F., MASS. ADVOCS. FOR CHILD.: BILL’S
BLOG (June 27, 2017, 1:50 PM), https://massadvocates.org/bills-blog-the-supreme-courts-decision-inendrew-f [https://perma.cc/N68U-3JRN] (providing commentary from a former hearing officer at the
Bureau of Special Education Appeals discussing the Massachusetts State Board of Education’s best
practices following Endrew F.).
202 Rachel Seelig & Marlyn Mahusky, Endrew F.: What the Supreme Court Has to Say About Special
Education, VT. LEGAL AID (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.vermontfamilynetwork.org/wpcontent/uploads/VFN-Webinar-Slides-Endrew-F.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NBG-VXE9].
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ensure that they are individualized and appropriately ambitious.203
Additionally, the team should craft a student’s IEP goals and objectives using
the guidance of the local or state educational standards to ensure that they
are sufficiently challenging. 204 Finally, courts should confirm that the school
district evaluated the child’s IEP goals using objective, peer-reviewed
research data collection procedures and teaching methods so that teachers
who may not have the appropriate knowledge or experience are not forced
to make subjective decisions. 205
In determining whether the second part of this test is met, courts should
also evaluate whether school districts utilize objective, data-driven standards
to develop a student’s yearly goals. 206 Specifically, courts should look at
whether schools districts assess progress based on data collected from
periodic evaluations and assessments of a student’s academic and behavioral
performance. 207 IEP teams can use this data to institute appropriate, researchbased remedies that would enhance student learning, 208 and school districts
may utilize technology to assist in this endeavor. 209
While the above-mentioned methods would assist in crafting an
appropriately ambitious IEP for students preparing to attend secondary
education institutions, the analysis likely differs for a child whose disability
203

Id.
See MacFarlane, supra note 129, at 555–56 (“In order to assess the appropriateness of a particular
stage of the educational process of a student, the parties need look at the student’s progress and
individualized education program in the context of his/her overall educational process within state and
local standards as well [] as within the context of the current information that the team is reviewing.”).
205 “The Court’s signal in Endrew F. is . . . to hold school districts to account for their choices and
proposals [when educating students with disabilities] with reasons that are ‘cogent and responsive.’”
Seligmann, supra note 132, at 493 (quoting Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 173 S. Ct. 988,
1002 (2017)). School districts can justify their decisions through the use of special education experts,
objective data, and by keeping sufficient records of student intervention methods. See John W.
Borkowski, The Implications of the Supreme Court’s Recent Decision in Endrew, ILL. ALL.
ADM’RS SPECIAL EDUC. (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.smore.com/app/attachments/download/
59d1765b99bb565e90b52ff0 [https://perma.cc/H34J-NRMN] (cautioning schools to use experts and
objective data and also to keep sufficient records of student intervention methods, since these schools are
required to provide justifications for their decisions).
206 Crane, supra note 201.
207 Turnbull et al., supra note 148, at 135.
208 See Bd. of Educ. v. Maez, No. 16-cv-1082 WJ/WPL, 2017 WL 3278945, at *7 (D.N.M. Aug. 1,
2017) (noting that every IEP must be “based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable”); A.G.
v. Bd. of Educ., No. 16 CV 1530, 2017 WL 1200906, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017) (referencing the
importance of research-based programs and reading systems).
209 See Dave L. Edyburn, Critical Issues in Advancing the Special Education Technology Evidence
Base, 80 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 7, 17 tbl. 1 (2013) (discussing how digital learning devices, digitalization,
and the collection of data through technological means assists in improving special education). One
example of such technology is the Illinois IEP Quality Project, which is a web-based tutorial and decisionmaking support system that helps educators create quality IEPs, plan instruction, and prioritize goals for
each student in relation to his or her needs and state learning goals. Forrest, supra note 192.
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may hinder his or her ability to attend a four-year college or university.
Courts should address these cases by stressing the use of “vocational
assessments,” 210 tests that help students with disabilities identify their
strengths and passions as well as find jobs that correspond to their interests. 211
Courts should examine whether school districts used these assessments,
along with other objective criteria, to establish realistic goals for a student to
achieve after high school, and then used reverse engineering to create an IEP
that addresses the skills the student will need to possess in order to succeed
in that vocation. 212 Depending on the individual circumstances, a student’s
IEP may be targeted toward teaching that child academic skills, daily living
skills, personal and social skills, or occupational skills.213
In sum, this Section sought to provide further guidance that would help
courts evaluate whether the appropriate progress standard was met in a given
case. The two-part test and corresponding guidance discussed in this Section
would help courts evaluate whether a particular IEP has met the appropriate
progress standard and would enable courts to make more consistent decisions
regarding whether a student was denied a FAPE. Scrutinizing a school
district’s procedures and the substantive quality of an IEP should ultimately
help courts feel more comfortable in making these determinations, while also
allowing school districts and parents to better understand their legal rights.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Endrew F. sought to clarify the morethan-thirty-year circuit split created after Rowley. The standard established
by Endrew F. should be read to provide further protection for special
education students, even if it has consequences in other areas of education
and requires significant systemic reform in certain school districts. The
Court’s articulation of the broad appropriate progress standard does create
new problems, however, as shown by the divergent interpretations already
occurring at the lower court level. To address this confusion, this Note has
proposed a two-part test that examines the adequacy of a district’s
procedures for developing IEPs and the substantive merits of an individual
student’s IEP. While the adoption of this test should mitigate some of the
outstanding confusion following Endrew F., several questions still remain
210

See, e.g., F.L. v. Bd. of Educ., 274 F. Supp. 3d 94, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (highlighting the use of
vocational assessments as a mechanism to help determine whether a student’s IEP was appropriate).
211 Edward M. Levinson & Eric J. Palmer, Preparing Students with Disabilities for School-to-Work
Transition and Postschool Life, COUNSELING 101, Apr. 2005, at 11, 12, https://my.vanderbilt.edu/
specialeducationinduction/files/2011/09/Transition-Planning1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UDE-ETEX].
212 See Seelig & Mahusky, supra note 202.
213 Levinson & Palmer, supra note 211, at 12.
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regarding which criteria should be used to determine the upper limits of the
FAPE requirement. Ideally, district and circuit courts will expound on this
standard and provide further guidance so that parents and school officials
can better understand their rights and expectations under the new standard.
Regardless, the Endrew F. holding should be seen as a victory for the special
education community that will better protect students and ensure that their
rights and opportunities under the IDEA are met.
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